

## CHAPTER 6

# Robert Kilwardby on the simultaneity of correlatives

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The Aristotelian category of relatives is studied in three works by Robert Kilwardby (d.1279) – the *Notulae super Librum Praedicamentorum*<sup>1</sup>, the *De Natura Relationis* and his Questions on Book I of the *Sentences*. In this paper I outline the treatment of relatives in those works, focusing on one of the supposed properties of correlatives – their simultaneity by nature. I compare the three treatments with one another and discuss their exegetical and philosophical merits.

### Introduction

The simultaneity of relatives is to be distinguished from another of their properties, namely their reciprocity.<sup>2</sup> Kilwardby sees this difference as one between linguistic and ontological levels – reciprocity being a linguistic matter, simultaneity at least partly an ontological one.<sup>3</sup>

The reciprocity of relatives can be understood as follows. Every relation has a subject and an object (or as Kilwardby puts it, a start-

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1. Alessandro Conti kindly supplied me with a working text in electronic form.

2. Aristotle, *Categories* 7, 6b29. *Aristoteles Latinus* I-1 19,3: “Omnia autem relativa ad convertentia dicuntur.”

3. Kilwardby, *Notulae*, Lectio 11 dub.6: “... dat duo propria, quorum primum est ex parte dicere, secundum ex parte coniuncti vel esse.” Lectio 11 dub.12: “... convertentia quae se habet sicut passio eorum quae sunt ad aliquid est secundum casualem habitudinem, sicut dicitur ‘filius patris filius’ et convertitur; convertibilitas autem sive conversio quae est coniuncta cum simul esse natura est convertibilitas secundum esse et non esse hoc modo, ‘Si pater est, filius est’ et econverso, et si non erit, non est econverso.”

ing-point and an end-point).<sup>4</sup> Sophroniscus is the father of Socrates. He is the subject of the relation of paternity, and Socrates is the object. We can, of course, make the object a subject and the subject an object; but if we do that we are dealing with a distinct relation. If we make Socrates the subject and Sophroniscus the object, we are dealing with the relation of filiation, which in a sense is the opposite of the relation of paternity,<sup>5</sup> or in modern terminology is the converse relation.

One must distinguish relations from relatives. A relation inheres in its subject as an accident. The opposite relation also inheres in its subject as an accident. Subjects may be designated in one of two ways: either independently of the relations that inhere in them, or else by denomination from those relations. When the subject is designated by denomination from the inhering relation, it is said to be a relative. Every relative has a correlative, namely the subject of the opposite relation, designated by denomination from that opposite relation. Let  $R$  be a relation, and let  $'R$  be its opposite (its converse). Let  $R_n$  be  $R$ 's subject as denominated from  $R$ , and let  $'R_n$  be  $'R$ 's subject as denominated from  $'R$ . Then the reciprocity of relatives is expressed by the formula

**Reciprocity**  $R_n$  is related by  $R$  to  $'R_n$ , and  $'R_n$  is related by  $'R$  to  $R_n$ .<sup>6</sup>

This should be understood as the general form of a double meaning-rule which gives the meaning of ' $R_n$ ' through that of ' $'R_n$ ', and gives the meaning of ' $'R_n$ ' through that of ' $R_n$ '.

Of itself, reciprocity does not imply that if one correlative (e.g. a master) exists then the other correlative (a slave) exists; however,

4. Kilwardby, *Notulae*, Lectio 10 dub. 5: "... dat intentionem unius extremorum, scilicet tantum existentis ex parte finis et non ex parte principii."

5. Aristotle, *Categories* 10, nrb24 speaks of pairs of *relatives* as being opposed, but Kilwardby also allows pairs of *relations* to be opposed. See Kilwardby, *Notulae*, Lectio 17 dub.4: "Sed hoc solvitur per hoc quod habent naturam oppositionis eo quod non possunt simul esse in eodem secundum quod relativa sunt, quia non sunt relativa neque dicuntur ad se invicem secundum quod accidit ea esse in eodem, quia paternitas in uno non ponit filiationem in eodem, sed interimit respectu eiusdem."

6. Compare Ackrill 1963:100.

Aristotle goes on to address this existential question. He asks whether relatives must be simultaneous by nature. Simultaneity by nature can be expressed by the formula:<sup>7</sup>

**Simultaneity** If an  $R_n$  exists, a ' $R_n$ ' exists.

*Categories* 7, 7b15–8a12 claims that natural simultaneity does seem to be a peculiarity of correlatives, but Aristotle goes on to consider a putative counter-example to this claim.<sup>8</sup> The counter-example concerns relative terms like ‘knowledge’ and ‘perception’. It seems that the correlatives of these are respectively ‘the knowable’ [*to epistēton*] and ‘the perceptible’ [*to aisthēton*]; but knowledge seems not to be simultaneous by nature with the knowable, nor perception with the perceptible, because while the existence of knowledge implies that of the knowable, it seems that the implication is not reversible:

For as a rule it is of actual things already existing that we acquire knowledge; in few cases, if any, could one find knowledge coming into existence at the same time as what is knowable. Moreover, destruction of the knowable carries knowledge to destruction, but destruction of knowledge does not carry the knowable to destruction. For if there is not a knowable there is not knowledge – there will no longer be anything for knowledge to be of – but if there is not knowledge there is nothing to prevent there being a knowable. Take, for example, the squaring of the circle, supposing it to be knowable; knowledge of it does not yet exist but the knowable itself exists. Again, if animal is destroyed there is no knowledge, but there may be many knowables.<sup>9</sup>

The argument leaves us with an inconsistent triad of the following form (where Aristotle has ‘knowledge’ and ‘perception’ in place of ‘A’, and ‘the knowable’ and ‘the perceptible’ in place of ‘B’):

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7. *Categories* 7, 7b15.

8. *Categories* 7, 7b15–8a12.

9. *Categories* 7, 7b24–35. Ackrill translation.

- (1) A and B are correlatives
- (2) A and B are not simultaneous by nature
- (3) All correlatives are simultaneous by nature.

An inconsistent triad demands a solution, and can be solved at two different levels. Logically – in order to restore consistency – a satisfactory solution must abandon or modify one of the three propositions. Dialectically, something more than this is required: a dialectical solution must not only be consistent; it must also account for the appearances, by explaining why it is that the three propositions *appear* to be true together. This may be achieved by distinguishing two different senses of some of the key terms, giving one logical solution for one set of terms, and another for another. Alternatively, since a dialectical solution is concerned with explaining the appearances, it may involve substituting for one of the terms a term that could be mistaken for it. In the present instance, it would be appropriate to distinguish different types of correlative, or different senses of ‘knowledge’ and ‘the knowable’ (or related terms).

In the case of the present inconsistent triad, there is also an exegetical question. Aristotle’s Inconsistent Triad appears to pose counter-examples (knowledge and the knowable) to the thesis that correlatives are naturally simultaneous. The exegetical question is, Are these genuine or merely apparent counter-examples? A given dialectical solution’s answer to this question depends on how it deals with the terms ‘knowledge’ and ‘knowable’. If it classifies them as correlatives and as non-simultaneous – i.e. if it takes propositions (1) and (2) to be true of these terms – then its answer is that Aristotle has given a genuine counter-example to the thesis that all correlatives are simultaneous, and that accordingly that thesis is to be rejected. If it classifies these terms in some other way, then its answer is that Aristotle’s counter-example is merely apparent, and that simultaneity by nature may well be a property of all correlatives.

If the exegetical question is answered in the negative (not all correlatives being naturally simultaneous), a further – and philosophical – question arises. Since all correlatives exhibit Reciprocity, if not all exhibit Simultaneity, the question is: what is it (in addition to

Reciprocity) that determines whether a given pair of correlatives possess Simultaneity?

We shall find Kilwardby offering answers to these logical, dialectical, exegetical, and philosophical questions.

### *Notulae*

The *Notulae* on the *Categories* dates from around 1237-40 when Kilwardby was in Paris. It comprises 21 *lectiones*, of which numbers 10 and 11 contain the main discussion of our topic. The *dubia* in *Lectio* 10 deal with the order of the categories, the question whether relations are a single genus of beings, the distinction between relations and relatives, the directedness of relatives and their correlativity. The *dubia* in *Lectio* 11 deal with the difference between contraries and relative opposites, the way in which relatives admit of more and less, and two properties of relatives (reciprocity and natural simultaneity). We begin with Kilwardby's division of relatives.

### The Division of Relatives

Kilwardby approaches Aristotle's Inconsistent Triad about the simultaneity of knowledge and the knowable by distinguishing different types of relatives, and different senses of 'knowledge' and 'the knowable'.

### *Types of relatives*

He offers two divisions of relatives, the first based purely on linguistic considerations, while the second mixes the linguistic with the ontological. The first of these divisions is based on the different ways in which one term can be described as being relative to another. It contrasts those relatives that are said of other things [*dici aliorum*] with those that are said relatively in any other way [*dici quomodolibet aliter ad aliud*]. The difference concerns the different linguistic markers of correlativity. As we saw earlier,  $R_n$  and ' $R_n$ ' are correlatives when an  $R_n$  stands in the relation  $R$  to a ' $R_n$ '. In inflected languages, such a correlativity can be marked by putting ' $R_n$ ' into the

genitive or ablative case and saying something like ‘A double is a double of a half’ or ‘The greater is greater than the lesser’.<sup>10</sup> But in other cases, a preposition or a prepositional phrase has to be used and the object is in the accusative or dative (as in ‘A mountain is called great in relation to another mountain’).<sup>11</sup> Thus we have the following fourfold division.<sup>12</sup>




Figure 1. Kilwardby’s first division of relatives in the *Notulae*.

Kilwardby clearly has in mind the *Categories* first definition of relatives, which defines them by reference to the grammatical cases through which they are expressed:

We call relatives all such things as are said to be just what they are, of or than other things, or in some way in relation to something else.<sup>13</sup>

However, he cautions against thinking that relatives expressed in the genitive case are more truly relatives than those expressed in other cases; for, he says, sometimes these are relatives only in their verbal expression and not in their essence, but rather by virtue of

<sup>10.</sup> Aristotle, *Categories* 7, 6b29; *Aristoteles Latinus* I-I 19,3-5 : “ut servus domini servus dicitur ... et maius minore maius.”

<sup>11.</sup> Aristotle, *Categories* 7, 6b8; *Aristoteles Latinus* I-I 18,15-17: “ut mons magnus dicitur ad montem alium (magnum enim ad aliquid dicitur), vel simile simile alicui dicitur.”

<sup>12.</sup> Kilwardby, *Notulae*, Lectio 10 dub.6 Note: “Intellige ergo in hoc genere genus generalissimum esse ‘ad aliquid’ vel hoc quod dico, ‘relatio’; genera intermedia et species dicamus esse, ‘dici aliorum’, ‘dici quomodolibet aliter ad aliud’; species autem specialissime huius ‘dici aliorum’: ‘dici genetive’, ‘dici ablative’; huius autem ‘dici quomodolibet aliter’: ‘dici accusative’, ‘dici dative’; ‘dici’ autem ‘sic genetive’, ‘sic dative’, ‘sic ablative’, etc., sunt individua.”

<sup>13.</sup> *Categories* 7, 6a36-37. Ackrill translation.




Figure 2. Kilwardby's second division of relatives in the *Notulae*.

something added to their essence.<sup>14</sup> The truest relatives are such through their very essence. For them, to be is to stand to something else in a certain way [*horum enim esse est ad aliud quodammodo se habere*]. Others are relative through something added to their essence. These others are relative *secundum modum sive secundum dictionem*, not *secundum esse et secundum veritatem*. Since *scientia* is said of *scibile* in the genitive case, Kilwardby's remarks here serve as a reminder that thus far we have no ground for supposing knowledge to be more, or less, truly a relative than anything else.

Our author now moves from Aristotle's grammatically-based classification of relatives to a division based on a mixture of linguistic and ontological considerations. His basic contrast here is between relatives *secundum dictionem* and *secundum esse*; but we must understand his talk of relatives *secundum dictionem* to mean those that arise *solely* on the basis of language, because according to him all relatives depend partly on language.<sup>15</sup>

Within the class of relatives *secundum dictionem* he includes those, such as *habitus*, *scientia* and *pictura*, which, though spoken of as rela-

<sup>14</sup>. Kilwardby, *Notulae Lectio 10 Note*: “Nec intellige ex iam dictis quod si genitive, quod verissime aut verius quam dative vel accusative; potest enim dici genitive et tamen esse ad aliquid secundum dictionem solum aut per aliquid additum suae essentiae, sicut habitus dicetur alicuius habitus, aut manus alicuius manus, sed illud verissime dicitur ad aliquid cuius esse est ad aliud quodammodo se habere sicut dicemus in sequentibus.”

<sup>15</sup>. Kilwardby, *Notulae Lectio 11*: “... communius sunt ad aliquid quae secundum dictionem quam quae secundum esse.”

tives, are really qualities, and acquire relative being only through something added to their essence. For instance, the relativity of a picture arises not from what it is (a coloured surface), but from something added to that, presumably its representational aspect. He also includes states which are spoken of as relatives by courtesy of a genus to which they belong. Contrasted with both these groups are relatives *secundum esse*, such as double and half, or great and small. Relatives *secundum esse* seem to satisfy Aristotle's second definition of relatives:

Those things are relatives for which being is the same as being somehow related to something.<sup>16</sup>

Kilwardby asks why it is that in certain instances the reciprocity of relatives preserves the same grammatical case, while in other instances it doesn't; and he suggests that this grammatical difference corresponds to an ontological one, namely the difference between correlatives which are what they are in mutual relation to one another, as against those which are such that the first is *per se* relative to the second but the second is relative to the first only because the first is relative to it. Knowledge and the knowable are related in this latter way.<sup>17</sup>

The ontological distinction here comes from *Metaphysics V* (Δ).15, where Aristotle sets correlatives that stand to each other as measure and measurable (like the knowable and knowledge), against those that are related as multiple to submultiple (like double and half) or

16. Aristotle, *Categories* 7, 8a31-32. Ackrill translation.

17. Kilwardby, *Notulae, Lectio II dub.9*: "Et causa huius sumitur secundum causam modorum significandi, quam non considerat logicus set supponit inesse. Vel potest dici quod quaedam sunt relativa quae id quod sunt sunt ad aliquid, quorum quidem comparatio aequaliter incipit ab utroque extremorum, ut sunt 'duplum' et 'dimidium'; et huiusmodi non habent differentiam casum in comparatione, sed maxime comparantur secundum genetivum casum, qui est maxime conveniens relationi; quandoque tamen secundum dativum, secundum quod est sumere dativum loco genetivi. Quaedam autem relativorum non sic se habent, sed est eorum comparatio quod una extremitatum per se est ad aliam, et non econverso, ut patet in 'scientia' et 'scibili'; 'scientia' enim per se dicitur ad scibile, 'scibile' vero non dicitur ad scientiam nisi per scientiam, unde quasi per denominationem est ad aliquid, et ideo dicitur ablative, 'scibile scientia scibile'."

as exceeding to exceeded or as what is able-to-act relative to what is able-to-be-acted-on.<sup>18</sup> Correlatives of the first type are not mutually dependent. Knowledge is what it is in relation to something else, but the knowable stands in relation to knowledge only because knowledge is relative to it. It is the knowable, not the knower, that is the measure.<sup>19</sup>

Given that knowledge is related *per se* to the knowable but the knowable is not related *per se* to it, *dub.14* of *Lectio II* presents two arguments that are designed to show that the knowable is always [*omnino*] relative. Kilwardby is concerned to dismiss both arguments.

The first argument is that since to be knowable is to have a passive potentiality in respect of a certain act, and the knowable is always so called on the basis of a potentiality, and because potentialities are so called by way of a relation, the knowable is in every case relative.<sup>20</sup>

The second argument has it that since the knowable is said by way of relation to knowledge, and since a relation terminates not in one but in two extremes, it's necessary to posit something else by which its relation is terminated, and this can only be knowledge. Thus, if we posit the knowable we must posit knowledge.<sup>21</sup>

His solution to the first argument invokes the principle that a genus may be relative while its species are not.<sup>22</sup> This principle is found in *Categories* 6 (where the example is grammar and knowledge), and also in *Metaphysics* V (Δ).15, 1021b3 (where the example is

18. On this threefold distinction, see King 2003: 36-38.

19. Aristotle, *Metaphysics* V (Δ).15, 1020b26-32; 1021a26-30.

20. Kilwardby, *Notulae, Lectio II dub .14*: “Sequitur postea de scientia et scibile, et quia scibile determinat potentiam passivam respectu alicuius actus, omnino a potentia ad actum dicitur secundum viam relationis, ut habetur in *IX<sup>o</sup> Metaphysicae*, videbitur scibile omnino ad aliquid se habere.”

21. *ibid.*: “Et praeter hoc: cum scibile ad scientiam <M 28va> dicatur secundum viam relationis, ponemus relationem <P 55vb> aliquam esse ex parte scibilis; non est autem relatio terminata in uno extremo sed in duobus, et necesse est tunc ponere aliquod alterum ad quod terminetur sua relatio, et hoc non potest esse nisi scientia: posito ergo scibili, necesse est ponere scientiam inesse.”

22. *ibid.*: “Primum solvitur per hoc quod non accidit speciem esse ad aliquid, quamvis genus ad aliquid dicatur, sicut se habet disciplina et grammatica: et ideo non est necesse scibile ad aliud se habere, quamvis potentia ad aliquid se habeat.”

doctoring and knowledge). The principle applies to the present case because the relativity of the genus (potentiality) doesn't entail that of the species (the knowable), except *secundum dictionem*.

His answer to the second argument is that the knowable is not always relative, since by 'the knowable' we may refer to something in its own nature,<sup>23</sup> i.e. we may refer to it independently of its relativity to being known.

According to this analysis, knowledge and the knowable fall into two different members of Kilwardby's second division. The quality that is knowledge falls into the first member: it becomes a relative through the addition of something relative to its essence. But the knowable falls into the second member: it is relative through its genus, the potential. Accordingly, Kilwardby goes on to distinguish two senses of 'the knowable' – the knowable as a potentiality together with an act of being known (which always stands to something), and the knowable as a potentiality without an act of being known (which doesn't).<sup>24</sup> This distinction will be crucial for his solution to Aristotle's Inconsistent Triad.

### *The Notulae Solution*

In defining simultaneity by nature, Kilwardby refers to Augustine.<sup>25</sup> The reference is in fact to the Pseudo-Augustinian *De Decem Categoris*, which speaks of the simultaneous rise and fall of correlatives.<sup>26</sup>

23. *ibid.*: "Ad postea quaesitum: solvitur per hoc quod non dicitur omnino ad aliquid scibile; quod enim dicitur ad aliquid debetur omnino scientiae et non naturae ipsius, sicut intendit Aristoteles in Vº *Metaphysicae*."

24. *ibid.*: "Scibile ergo dicitur duplíciter, scilicet potentia scibile et actu scitum, et sic se habet omnino ad scientiam; vel potentia scibile et non actu scitum, et sic non se habet: et ita, si ponatur scibile inesse ut actu est, necesse est scientiam ponere inesse aliquo. Nequaquam sunt igitur instantiae apparentes ut hic intendit Aristoteles."

25. Kilwardby, *Notulae, Lectio 11 dub.12*: "Unde 'simul natura' dicitur hic ut simul natura dicitur esse ab Augustino, simul esse secundum ortum et occasum; haec enim posita se, ponunt, destructa se, destruunt."

26. Pseudo-Augustine, *De Decem Categoris, Aristoteles Latinus 1.1-5: 155,12-15*: "Tunc ergo et vere et proprie ad-aliquid dicitur cum sub uno ortu atque occasu et id quod iungitur et id cui iungitur invenitur: ut puta servus et dominus, utrumque vel simul est vel simul non est ..."

Given this notion of simultaneity, and given Kilwardby's distinction between the knowable that is actually known and the knowable that is only potentially known, we can deduce his solution to Aristotle's Inconsistent Triad as applied to knowledge and the knowable. If the knowable is considered as an unactualised potentiality, then proposition (1), that knowledge and the knowable are correlatives, is true only *secundum dictionem*; but if the knowable is taken as an actualised potentiality, proposition (1) is true *secundum esse*. By contrast, proposition (2), that knowledge and the knowable are *not* simultaneous by nature, is true only when knowledge is considered as a quality, or when the knowable is taken as an unactualised potentiality. It is false when knowledge is considered as a relative and the knowable is taken as an actualised potentiality. So, proposition (3), that all correlatives are simultaneous by nature, is true of correlatives *secundum esse*, but not true of correlatives *secundum dictionem*. Considering the four resultant cases, we see that in no case are propositions (1), (2) and (3) all true together. For mutually dependent *secundum esse* correlatives, proposition (3) is true – such correlatives are simultaneous by nature – and therefore the *Categories* counter-examples must be merely apparent.

Kilwardby's view is that the knowable – in his artificially contrived sense – is the *secundum esse* correlative of knowledge and is simultaneous with it. On the other hand, for correlatives that are not *secundum esse* or not mutually dependent, proposition (3) is false – such correlatives may not be simultaneous by nature – and therefore the *Categories* counter-examples must be genuine. So much for the exegetical question.

The *Notulae*'s answer to the philosophical question, of what turns reciprocating relatives into simultaneous ones, is that simultaneous relatives need to be *secundum esse* and they need to be mutually dependent.

However, it is not at all clear that other apparent exceptions to the simultaneity of correlatives can be dealt with in an analogous manner. Kilwardby considers the case of things related to one another by priority and posteriority, but his treatment of this case is quite different from that of knowledge and the knowable. That which is prior, considered under the concept of priority, is simulta-

neous by nature with that which is posterior, considered under the concept of posteriority; but that in which the priority inheres is prior to that in which the posteriority inheres.<sup>27</sup>

### *De Natura Relationis*

Whereas the *Notulae* is a question-commentary on Aristotle's text, the *De Natura Relationis*, dating from after 1250 when Kilwardby was in Oxford, comprises a sequence of 35 questions on various subjects connected with the category of relatives. Some of the matters discussed arise from purported difficulties in Aristotle's *Metaphysics*, the *Liber Sex Principiorum* and Augustine's *De Trinitate*. Generalities concerning relatives and their abstract relations are followed in Ch.4 by an elaborate division of the category. Chs. 5 and 6 deal with the question whether a relative enters into the definition of its correlate. Chs. 7 to 9 deal with contrariety among relatives. Ch.10 discusses the problem (arising from the *Liber Sex Principiorum*) whether when two things are similar to one another, they are similar by virtue of one similitude or two numerically distinct similitudes. (Kilwardby favours the latter view, which he describes as *forte veriora quam ea, quae tradit auctor Sex Principiorum.*<sup>28</sup>) Discussion of knowledge, the knowable and the simultaneity of correlatives begins at Ch.11 ('On correlatives, one of which is essentially relative and the other accidentally'). Ch.12 distinguishes between knowledge as it is *in* a subject (the knower) and knowledge as it is *of* a subject (the knowable). The former is *per se* a quality, and is a relative only *per accidens* (namely *per genus*); the latter is *per se* a relation, or a relative.<sup>29</sup> Ch.13 is about relatives *secundum dictiōnem*. Ch.14 explains the sense in which knowledge, considered in relation to its subject matter, is a relative essentially, even though the knowable is relative only accidentally. There follows a discussion of the question whether opposites are

27. Kilwardby, *Notulae* Lectio 11 dub.13: "... prius, sub ratione illa qua est prius, est simul cum eo quod est posterius, sub ratione illa qua est posterius; id tamen cui accidit prioritas est prius eo cui accidit posterioritas et non simul. Similiter autem intellege et in aliis."

28. Kilwardby, *De Natura Relationis* Ch. 10, 18,13-14.

29. Kilwardby, *De Natura Relationis* Ch. 12, 19,29-32; 20,5-7.

relatives (Chs.15-7), and about the relativity of When and Where, Position and Having (Chs.18-20). The discussion enters theological waters at Chs.21-22, 25-27, and 34, where Kilwardby's doctrines about relatives are applied to creatures and the creator, in the context of Augustine's treatment of these matters in his *De Trinitate*. The relativity of prime matter is dealt with in Ch.23. Ch.24 analyses the sense in which a relative or a relation may be a substance. Chs.28-32 engage in an extended disputation on the prior and posterior, considered as correlatives. Ch.33 applies the doctrine of relatives to foreknowledge and predestination.

### *The Division of Relatives*

Kilwardby begins his investigation of the division of relatives by observing that since relatives exist only in respect of other things, their division should proceed through a consideration of those other things.<sup>30</sup> The fundamental distinction he draws is that between essential relatives (whose being depends on that of their correlate) and accidental ones (where this is not so). On this basis he distinguishes those pairs of correlatives which are essentially relative to each other, from those where one is essentially relative to the other while the other is only accidentally relative to it. Knowledge and the knowable are of this second sort.<sup>31</sup> An excerpt from his division is shown in Figure 3.

30. Kilwardby, *De Natura Relationis* Ch. 4, 7,9-11: "Et nota, quod quia res huius generis non sunt nisi respectus aliarum rerum, oportet per considerationem aliarum rerum et earum diversas ad invicem habitudines hoc genus dividere hoc modo."

31. Kilwardby, *De Natura Relationis* Ch. 11, 18,21-38: "... illud dicitur essentialiter relativum, cuius esse dependet ab existentia alterius, illud autem per accidens, cuius esse non dependet a correlativo, v.g.: sensus non est nisi per sensibile, et hoc neque in actu primo neque in actu secundo. Organum enim sensus ex sensibilibus est et ipsum completum est per actionem sensibilium. Ipsum etiam sentire est quoddam pati a sensibili factum in sensu, sed sensibile perfecte existit et completetur tam in actu primo quam in actu secundo sine actione sensus, et ideo sensibile est per accidens relativum et sensus essentialiter. Et sicut dixi de sensu et sensibile, ita est de intellectu et intelligibili et de scientia et scibili et omnibus huiusmodi, in quibus, si subtoller inspiceris, unum illorum habere rationem primi, quod non iuvatur a reliquo, ut sit, et alterum rationem secundi, quod iuvatur a reliquo, ut sit, et illud secundum




Figure 3. Kilwardby's division of relatives in *De Natura Relationis* (Excerpt).

### *The De Natura Relationis Solution*

The *De Natura Relationis* reconsiders and deepens the *Notulae*'s definition of natural simultaneity. The author explains that for correlatives to be simultaneous by nature, what is required is not the mutual implication of their *actual* being, but the mutual implication of the sort of being that is appropriate to their natures.<sup>32</sup> This revision allows Kilwardby to maintain that the temporally prior and the temporally posterior, considered as correlatives, are simultaneous by nature, because “if the prior is now, or if it is not now but will be, then the posterior will be” and so on.<sup>33</sup> Given this revised definition

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propterea essentialiter refertur ad primum, sed primum non secundum nisi quia secundum ad ipsum; unde et a secundo sequitur consequentia ad primum et non convertitur et, si sensus est, sensibile est et non econverso, et si scientia est, scibile est et non econverso, ut ostendit Aristoteles in Praedicamentis.”

32. Kilwardby, *De Natura Relationis* Ch. 32, 44,35-45,4: “Correlativa enim simul esse natura, sic intelligo, quod ad esse unius sequatur esse alterius reciproce, et ad non esse unius non esse alterius reciproce. Et hoc non est, quod ad esse unius actuale sequatur esse alterius actuale, sed quod ad esse uni debitum a natura sua, sequatur esse alteri debitum a natura sua ... 46,2-6: ... et exinde etiam patet, quomodo intelligendum sit correlativa esse simul natura; hoc enim non est, quod sint simul secundum existentiam vel tempus vel simul secundum ortum et occasum, ut prius determinabatur, sed quod invicem per necessariam consequentiam ponant vel intermant esse sibi naturaliter debitum.”

33. Kilwardby, *De Natura Relationis* Ch. 32, 45,22-23.

of natural simultaneity, the *De Natura Relationis* solution to Aristotle's Inconsistent Triad comes down to three points.

First, the knowable is relative to knowledge; but while it is essentially relative, the knowable is relative to it merely accidentally. Thus, knowledge and the knowable do not form a pair of essential correlatives. There is, however, another pair that are essential correlatives, namely the knower [*sciens*] and the known [*scitum*].<sup>34</sup>

Second, knowledge is not simultaneous by nature with the knowable; rather, the knowable is prior by nature. The known, however, is simultaneous with the knower.

Third, when one correlative is essential and the other accidental, they are not simultaneous.<sup>35</sup>

34. Kilwardby, *De Natura Relationis* Ch. 11, 19,1-11: "Nota tamen, quod pluraque huiusmodi relativorum non incongrue possunt reduci ad relationem essentiale per commutationem nominum designantium potentias in nomina significantia actiones et passiones, et forte nisi esset penuria nominum, omnia possent v.g.: sensus et sensibile ex parte sensus referuntur essentialiter, et ex parte sensibilis accidentaliter, et ideo, si sensus est, sensibile est et non convertitur, similiter scientia et scibile et huiusmodi. Sed sentiens et sensatum, sciens et scitum utrobique referuntur essentialiter, et ideo sequitur, si sentiens est, sensatum est et econverso, et si sciens est, scitum est et econverso. Sed hoc est, quia actio essentialiter refertur ad passionem, et passio essentialiter ad actionem, et neutra potest esse sine altera sed simul sunt tempore et origine et duratione." The point about *sciens* and *scitum* is to be found in Averrœs's commentary on *Metaphysics* Δ, Text 20, 165-171: "Et existimatur quod illud, cuius genus est relativum, est etiam relativum. Sed ista existimatio accidit secundum hoc quod scientia est modi relativorum quae referuntur ad invicem propter hoc quod convenient in eodem, sicut aequale et simile. Aequalia enim sunt relativa quia convenient in eodem. Et quia existimatur quod scientia est huiusmodi, quia est idem in quo convenient sciens et scitum, continget ut medicus sit ex hoc modo relativorum."

35. Kilwardby, *De Natura Relationis* Ch. 28, 37,26-35: "Tandem quaeritur de illa famosa proprietate correlativorum, quod videntur simul esse natura, ut dicit Aristoteles in Praedicamenta; videtur enim habere instantiam universaliter in omnibus illis, quorum unum refertur essentialiter et alterum accidentaliter, quorum unum iuvat ad esse alterius et non econverso, ut praedictum est. Ideo sequitur, si sensus est, sensibile est et non econverso, et si scientia est, scibile est et non econverso, et haec instantia vera est, et ideo Aristoteles in Praedicamentis non dicit, quod omnia, quae sunt ad aliquid sunt, sunt simul natura, sed quod videntur esse simul natura, et postea instat in praedictis, scilicet sensu et sensibili, scientia et scibili, et non solvit, quia verae sunt instantiae."

He notes that there seem to be counter-examples to his claim that essential correlatives are always simultaneous. Part and whole are correlatives, both of which are essentially relative; and yet part is prior to whole. The same seems to be true of half and double, of cause and caused, of principle and principled, of father and son, and others. In all these instances, an argument of the following form might be advanced: the cause, in so far as it is a cause, is prior to the caused; and the cause as such is relative; and so, as relative, it is prior to the caused. Kilwardby's answer is that correlatives, both of which are essentially so, are simultaneous by nature so long as they are taken *ratione relationis* and not *ratione rei*.<sup>36</sup>

This distinction seems to be the same as the one he invoked in the *Notulae* to deal with the case of priority and posteriority. Here, however, it combines with the distinction between essential and accidental relatives, to form the basis of a systematic treatment. The two distinctions are mutually orthogonal, creating four possible cases. (1) When correlatives are mutually essential (like the knower and the known) and are considered *ratione relationis*, they are simultaneous by nature. (2) When one correlative is accidental to the other (like knowledge and the knowable) and they are considered *ratione relationis*, they are not simultaneous by nature. (3) When they are mutually essential and are considered *ratione rei*, they are not simultaneous by nature. (4) When one is accidental to the other and they are considered *ratione rei*, they are not simultaneous by nature. The overall position of De *Natura Relationis* concerning correlatives taken *ratione relationis* and not *ratione rei* is summarised in Table 1.

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36. *Ibid*, 38,3-8: "... sed facile solvitur. Quia in nomine causae duo sunt relatio a qua nomen imponitur et res cui inest relatio et cui nomen imponitur, et ratione rei prior est causato, ratione relationis, simul est cum eo, et ideo fallit consequentia rationis, quia in prima propositione fit reduplicatio ratione rei, in secunda ratione relationis, et eodem modo solvenda est similis ratio, si fiat in aliis."

		Correlatives	
		Essential in both directions	Accidental in one direction
Reason	By reason of their relation	Simultaneous	Non-simultaneous
	By reason of the things	Non-simultaneous	Non-simultaneous

Table 1. Kilwardby's solution (*De Natura Relationis*)

### *The Sentences Commentary*

Question 74 of Kilwardby's commentary on Book I of the *Sentences* is about relatives and relations. Here, a preliminary argument about knowledge and the knowable is posed in the following form:

Again, knowledge is referred to the knowable not only *secundum dictio-nem* but also *secundum esse*, but in reverse the knowable to knowledge only *secundum dictio-nem*, as Aristotle teaches.<sup>37</sup>

His attitude towards the simultaneity of correlatives is stated as follows:

It is to be said therefore that 'Relatives are simultaneous by nature' is not to be understood in such a way that the actual being of one always follows from that of the other, but that from the being naturally due to one there follows the being naturally due to the other .... If however the relatives are incompossible, then from the actual being of one there follows the future or past being of the other.... In the same way with correlatives if perhaps they relate to the possible being of their counterparts ....<sup>38</sup>

37. Robert Kilwardby, *Quaestiones in Librum Primum Sententiarum* q. 74: 8-10.

38. *Ibid.*, q. 74: 255-266.

## Comparison of the three works

The *De Natura Relationis* does not exhibit the same interest in linguistic matters that is found in the *Notulae*. All the same, there is considerable continuity between the two works. Both rely on the distinction between correlatives that are mutually essential and those that are not. And both invoke a distinction between cases where a relative is designated by reference to the relation that inheres in it, and cases where it is designated independently of that relation. But the treatment of the natural simultaneity of correlatives in the *De Natura Relationis* marks an advance over that in the *Notulae* because of its revision of the definition of simultaneity and more broadly because of its more systematic approach.

The treatment of the simultaneity of relatives in the *Sentences* commentary appears to be the same as in the *De Natura Relationis*.

So far as the treatment of the simultaneity of correlatives is concerned, the similarities and differences between the three works could be seen as pointing to a process of critical reflection on the early work, resulting in a theoretical reworking of the same philosophical position into one that is more ontologically oriented, more conceptually focused, and less artificial.

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